Abstract in English:

Abstract This submission is addressed to the symposium on Prof. André Abath’s book “Knowing What Things Are: An Erotetic-Based Account” (2022).

Abstract in English:

Abstract In Knowing What Things Are, Abath shifts the focus of epistemology from propositional knowledge to the capacity to answer questions, emphasizing knowledge as an outcome of human activity. He highlights the role of interrogatives in epistemic evaluation. However, his emphasis on Socratic questions ("What is X?") overlooks the interconnectedness of different types of questions within an inquiry. This paper examines two Socratic questions: "What is a gene?" and "What is a marriage?" In the case of "What is a gene?" advances in molecular biology challenge the classical molecular gene concept, leading to a pluralistic or emergent definition. Inquiry into genes involves meta-level questions concerning the concept’s definition and the role of related terms such as "heritable." Similarly, "What is a marriage?" encompasses both descriptive and normative dimensions, requiring an understanding of legal, social, and cultural definitions. Abath’s erotetic framework, which aims to refine answers to Socratic questions, must account for these meta-level inquiries and the various ways an inquiry can be directed to provide a more comprehensive depiction of knowledge as an activity.

Abstract in English:

Abstract This book symposium comprises a précis of André J. Abath’s book Knowing What Things Are: An Inquiry-Based Approach (Springer, 2022) together with five critical commentaries on different aspects of the book-written by Veronica Campos, Guilherme Araújo Cardoso, Giulia Felappi, Ernesto Perini-Santos and Leonardo de Mello Ribeiro-, and the author’s replies.

Abstract in English:

Abstract While philosophers are and have always been interested in, if not obsessed by, questions of the kind What is x?, somehow ironically, the question What is knowledge of what x is? did not receive much attention. Thankfully, to properly answer this question, André Abath suggested his erotetic view, according to which S knows what x is in context c if and only if S knows a proposition (or propositions) that properly answer (that is, provide a proper answer to) the question of what x is in c, where for a proposition to properly answer a question in a context it should be such that, in that context, it settles the question, it brings the inquiry to a close. In my commentary, I will discuss whether the erotetic view might be taken to give us too few or too many knowers. During such discussion, I will investigate into Abath’s notion of partial knowledge and his sophisticated rejection of the claim that his view is excessively intellectualist.

Abstract in English:

Abstract This paper critically engages with André Abath’s Knowing What Things Are: An Inquiry-Based Approach (2022), which develops an erotetic account of knowledge about what things are. According to Abath, to know what X is, one must know propositions that serve as appropriate answers to the question “What is X?” within a given inquiry context. While this view successfully accommodates variations in epistemic demands across contexts, I argue that it overlooks the role of deal-breaker propositions - false claims that fundamentally undermine knowledge ascription, even when surrounded by otherwise accurate information. By introducing the notion of relative essences, I propose an amendment to Abath’s account that accounts for the epistemic weight of these propositions. This refinement strengthens the erotetic view by addressing cases where misleading assertions obstruct knowledge transmission.

Abstract in English:

Abstract In "Knowing What Things Are", A. Abath’s account of knowledge has two main features. Firstly, it is inquiry-based or erotetic: knowledge is to be understood in terms of answers to questions of the form “What is x?” Secondly, it is contextualist: answers to questions of the form “what is x?” are dependent on contextual factors, as they should be evaluated as true and satisfactory given the specific purposes (or goals) of an inquiry. Here I focus on the contextualist component of Abath's account. I argue that there is a tension between the descriptive account Abath advocates in chapters 1-5 and the normative account developed in chapters 6-7. I argue, in particular, that Abath's contextualism faces trouble when applied to knowledge of strongly social kinds and moral/political obligations, which are inherently normative.